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This Working Paper is one of a series embodying the outcome of a workshop 
and conference on Economic  S t m c t u ~ d  Change: Analyt ical  Issues, held a t  IIASA 
in July and August of 1983. The conference and workshop formed part of the 
continuing IIASA program on Patterns of Economic Structural Change and 
Industrial Adjustment. 
Structural change was interpreted very broadly: the  topics covered 
included the nature and causes of changes in different sectors  of the  world 
economy, the  relationship between international markets and national 
economies, and issues of organization and incentives in large economic sys- 
tems. 
There is a general consensus that  important economic structural  changes 
a re  occurring in the world economy. There are, however, several alternative 
approaches to measuring these changes, to modeling the process, and to devis- 
ing appropriate responses in terms of policy measures and institutional 
redesign. Other interesting questions concern the role of t h e  international 
economic system in transmitting such changes, and the meri ts  of alternative 
modes of economic organization in responding to s tructural  change. All of 
these issues were addressed by participants in the workshop and conference, 
and will be the focus of the continuation of the research program's work. 
Geoffrey Heal 
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
Erno Zalai 
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1. TNTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses various issues related to, and in the framework of, a 
computable general equilibrium model of an open economy. The particular 
economy represented by the  numerical model is tha t  of Hungary and the model 
is used, among other things, to  highlight some issues connected with economic 
reform. Foreign trade will be a focal point in our analysis of changing resource 
allocation patterns under various assumptions. 
Ideas for economic reform in Eastern Europe have in recent years 
developed through several stages; nevertheless, some basic elements have 
remained practically unchanged. Among these lat ter  is the  establishment of 
economically more sound price systems, the  increased role of prices in 
economic decisions both a t  the central (macro) and the  enterprise (micro) 
level, and the  simultaneous decentralization of decision making. The various 
suggestions for economic reform have rarely been based on a rigorously 
developed economic the oretical framework. However, i t  is probably fair to say 
that in most cases they have relied on some intuitive model of perfect competi- 
tion stimulated by individual or group financial/material interest. Hence, we 
believe tha t  the adoption of a competitive general equilibrium model frame- 
work for the analysis of expected outcomes of economic reform measures is 
justified. 
In our analysis attention will be focused on rather  specific problems. 
Within the  usual competitive static framework we will evaluate the expected 
impact of a price reform on the allocation of resources and the consequent 
gains in economic efficiency. Comparative static analysis involves the  basic 
assumption that  the underlying structure of the economy, for example, 
*International hs t i tu te  for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. On leave from the Karl 
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technological conditions and consumer preferences, remains unchanged. This 
critical feature of the analysis will assume a special meaning in our case and 
add an important qualification to the interpretation of the  results. 
One plausible interpretation of the above assumptions is suggested by 
some ideas especially typical of earlier stages in the formulation of reform con- 
cepts. These were concerned mostly with the question of how to improve cen- 
tral planning by means of establishing economically more sound price systems, 
which would aid planners in allocating resources according to optimal resource 
use. 
Another, somewhat related interpretation can be distilled from the actual 
reform experience in Hungary. Many observers inside and outside Hungary 
assert that,  because of surviving institutional rigidities and worsening external 
trade conditions, the economic reform did not produce satisfactory results a t  
the micro (enterprise) level. The enterprises failed to modernize their product 
structure to a sufficient extent, and consequently the increase in productivity 
and competitiveness on foreign and domestic markets was smaller than had 
been expected. Our simulation results suggest that ,  under such conditions, one 
can really expect only modest results (if any improvements a t  all) from the  
introduction of an equilibrium price system and the  corresponding reallocation 
of resources, i.e., following the  rules of a laissez-faire market equilibrium. 
As mentioned above, we employ here a model of the computable general 
equilibrium type* to assess the repercussions of the assumed changes in a con- 
sistent manner. The basic assumption is that changes in relative prices and 
costs will be followed by appropriate shifts in the composition of inputs, out- 
puts, consumption, and trade. While the model is intended to capture some ele- 
ments of the working of an economic or planning system in which prices and 
market considerations play some role, albeit limited, it should not and cannot 
be regarded as a fully adequate, descriptive model of the Hungarian or any 
other real economy. Our basic aim is to test various reform concepts under the  
conditions outlined above. 
Since we are dealing with an open economy, special attention is also paid 
to foreign trade and the possible effects of trade-liberalization policies. We 
repeat our comparative static exercise under alternative assumptions concern- 
ing export conditions. In some runs we assume- (we believe, quite realistically) 
that, due t o  our inability to  alter the export structure or to  unfavorable exter- 
nal conditions, changes in the volume of exports a re  accompanied by 
endogenously-induced terms-of-trade changes. We will show that ,  contrary to 
some common beliefs, moving closer to a market equilibrium (in such a situa- 
tion) does not necessarily improve Pareto efficiency. The increase i.n allocative 
efficiency will be reduced and may even be completely offset by endogenously- 
induced terms-of-trade deterioration. The optimum tariff argument suggests 
that in such cases i t  might be advantageous to  keep some central control over 
export  decision.^. since individual exporters may not perceive (or it  may not be 
in their interest to account for) this scale effect. 
Finally, the paper also addresses a more general, methodological issue con- 
cerning computable general equilibrium modeling. This is the question of the  
treatment of foreign trade in general, and the so-called Armington assumption 
in particular. The numerical examples presented will illustrate the  effect of 
alternative assumptions regarding export functions and the size of export 
*Models of this type have been developed during the past decade in various places for economic poli- 
cy analyses. Some representative examples are the work of Johansen (1959), D e . ~ s  et al. (1982), 
Dixon e t  al. (1982), Kelley et  al. (1983), md Scarf and Shoven (1983). 
elasticities. I t  will be argued that  the export demand furlctions and values of 
elasticities frequently adopted introduce unwanted and unreasonable terms-of- 
trade effects into the analysis, and that  these effects should and can be avoided. 
2. THE MODEL: AN OUTLINE 
Before presenting a complete mathematical statement of the model, we 
will give an informal, brief outline for the sake of readers less interested in 
mathematical formulas. The model in most of its elements follows quite closely 
what may already be called a "traditional" computable general equilibrium 
approach. In this outline we will, however, also comment on some less tradi- 
tional features of our model, which distinguish it  from related models 
developed elsewhere. 
Commodities in the model represent sectoral outputs and, according to  
one fairly common statistical classification in Hungary, 19 sectors are dis- 
tinguished. Commodities are further classified into three categories: domesti- 
cally produced, and competitive and noncompetitive imports. Both imports and 
exports are also classified in terms of dollar and rouble trading areas, which 
results in a fairly detailed foreign trade structure. Rouble trade in this version 
of the model is exogenously given, reflecting the fact tha t  rouble trade flows as 
a rule are fixed by five-year bilateral agreements and thus are relatively 
inflexible over the short term. Exports and competitive imports are  treated as 
perfect substitutes for domestic products. This treatment, especially in the  
case of imports, is a departure from the  traditional, neoclassical general equili- 
brium models, in which imports are usually t reated as imperfect substitutes. 
Nevertheless, we employ formally similar, relative price dependent import 
share functions, as in the more traditional models, which can be derived on the  
basis of cost-minimization assumptions and a CES-type substitution function. 
Our rationale for using these import share functions is, however, different from 
the neoclassical one (which assumes imperfect substitutability and perfect 
adjustment). They are intended to simply reflect limited (probably imperfect) 
adjustments to  relative price changes, which may be caused by a variety of fac- 
tors. (It should be mentioned, though, that  the  numerical results are not much 
affected by this change in treatment.) As a result, we have two sets  of balance 
equations for the sectoral commodities: one combined balance for domesti- 
cally produced goods plus competitive imports, and one for the  noncompetitive 
imports (eqns. 1 and 3, below). 
Total use of commodities is split up between production, investment, con- 
sumption, and export (if applicable). Use in production and investment is 
determined through fixed input-output coefficients (Leontief technology). Con- 
sumption is treated in a special way, which can be viewed as a generalization of 
the frequently used Linear Expenditure System (LES). Total consumption (see 
eqns. 15-17) is made up of a fixed part (identified here with the base consump- 
tion) and a variable part (excess consumption). The structure of the lat ter  is 
fixed (a Leontief or Kantorovich type of preference function), thus leaving only 
the level of excess consumption to vary. This makes the  implicit objective (wel- 
fare) function similar to those employed in sorne linear planning models. 
Another special advantage of this formulation is tha t  it allows us to measure 
*The model employed here was developed by the author, and more elaborate discussion of i t  ctm be 
found in Zalai (1980, 1982). The author wishes to achowledge the valuable assistance i n  preparing 
the numerical version of the model given by his colleagues h t.he Hungarian Planning Office. 
welfare changes in a conceptually very simple way. 
Gross investment is defined by eqn. (2) as  the sum of replacement and new 
investment. The former is determined by the variable sectoral capital stocks 
and fixed replacement coefficients, which are different from the amortization 
rates. The amount of new (net) investment is  exogenously given in this version 
of the model. 
Labor and capital a re  undifferentiated with respect to their sectoral use: 
the;. are assumed to be freely mobile across sectors. The uses of labor and cap- 
ital in production are specified by Cobb-Douglas production capacity functions 
(which results in a Johansen-type production technology). Sectors are assumed 
to minimize the joint cost of labor and capilal used. Total available labor and 
capital are held constant and assumed to be fully utilized (see balance equa- 
tions 4 and 5). 
The rest of the foreign trade relations are modeled as follows. Dollar 
exports are assumed to adjust to relative (domestic/foreign) price changes and 
the size of shifts is determined by fixed elasticity coefficients.* This is a nor- 
mal, but critical treatment. Such a formulation is traditionally supported by 
Armington's (1969) assumption about regional product differentiation and leads 
to a downward-sloping export demand function. Conversely i t  means that  the  
export price is assumed to change with the  volume of export. This is a tenable 
assumption even in the case of a "small" country, but leads to some problems 
seldom addressed in applied models. We will come back to this point during the 
discussion of the results. Since rouble trade flows are fixed, we have only one 
balance-of-payment (current  account) constraint in the model for dollar trade. 
The target deficit level is fixed in the model. 
Now we turn to the description of the equilibrium pricing rules. As a basic 
principle we have tried to follow as closely as possible the so-called two- 
channel, normative price formation rule, discussed extensively in the litera- 
ture related to price reform ideas (see, for example, Csik6s-Nagy 1975). Equili- 
brium (domestic producers') prices are, thus, defined as  the sum of unit 
material costs, amortization, wages, and uniformly determined (normative) 
returns on labor and capital. The normative rates of return on labor and net  
capital are determined endogenously as equilibrium rates (factor clearing 
prices). The domestic price of dollar imports is  determined through their world 
market price and the  equilibrium exchange rate. The domestic price of rouble 
imports (since they are fixed) needs special treatment. In the noncompetitive 
sphere it  is assumed to  move in proportion to the price of dollar noncompeti- 
tive imports, whereas in the competitive sphere it varies proportionally to the 
average price level of the substitutes. And, finally, since we do not record how 
large the share of inputs from various sources is in different uses, the same 
average sectoral prices are used to evaluate the composite input in each area 
of use. 
A complete formal description of the model, including the  list of variables 
and parameters, now follows in Section 3. 
*In two sectors (foreign trade and waterworks) we held export constant. In the first case because of 
accounting problems (some part of export earning is counted in t he  foreign trade sector, and as a 
result i t  shows up as if it were an independent and very profitable exporting activity), and in the 
second case because of i t s  negligible role and inelastic nature. 
3. FORMAL STLT%:!TEXT OF TI* FdODEL 
Endogenous Va~iables 
Xj gross output in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  . . , n 
Mid competitive dollar import of commodity i = 1 , 2 , .  . . , n 
Z dollar export of commodit,~ i = 1 , 2 ,  . . . , n 
xi!.-+ 1 total gross investment M i , ~ i d  total and dollar noncompetitive import of commodity 
i = 1 ,2 ,  . . . ,  n 
Ci total private and public consumption of domestic-competitive 
- 
import commodity i = 1 , 2 , ,  . . , n 
Ci total private and public consumption of noncompetitive 
import commodity i = 1,2,  . . , , n 
Kj capital used in sector j = 1 ,2 ,  . . . , n 
kj capital coefficient in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  . . , n  
Lj labor employed in sector j = 1,2 ,  . . . , n 
Z j  labor coefficient in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  , . , n 
Sj user cost of labor and capital per unit of output in sector j = 1 , 2 , . . . , n  
Wj user cost of labor in sector j = 1 , 2 ,  . . . , n 
W net  rate  of return requirement on labor 
Q user cost of capital in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  . . , n 
R net  rate of return requirement on capital 
- 
mi share of rouble import in total noncompetitive import of com- 
modity i = 1,2. .  . . , n 
rnir,mid proportions of competitive rouble and dollar imports of com- 
modity i = 1.2.. . , , n 
P domestic producer's price of commodity j = 1,2 ,  . . . , n d 
Pjd dollar export price of commodity j = 1 , 2 ,  . . . , n 
dollar exchange rate 
average price of domestic-import composite commodity 
i = 1 , 2 , , . . , n  
E total consumption expenditure 
EE excess expenditure level 
Ezogenous Variables and Parameters 
sj capital replacement rate in sector j = 1 ,2 ,  . . . , n 
P new investment (at base prices) 
6 j  depreciation rate in sector j = 1 .2 , .  . . , n 
K total capital stock 
L total labor 
q d , z i d  parameters in the dollar export functions 
to,#. parameters in the production functions 
P ~ P ,  dollar world market export and import prices of commodity i 
(compe titive-noncompetitive import) 
Dd target surplus or deficit on dollar foreign trade balance 
% input coefficient of domestic-import composite commodity 
i = 1 , 2 , .  . . , n in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  . . ,n ,n  +1 
M rouble competitive and noncompetitive imports of corn.modity 
i = 1 ,2 ,  . . . ,  n 
Zp, rouble export of commodity i = 1 ,2 ,  . . . , n 
mg,rn$ parameters  in t h e  import functions, i = 1 , 2 , .  . . ,n 
CLiT'k&i 1 
bi,bi fixed (base) amount of total consumption of commodity 
i = l , 2 .  . . . ,  n 
- 
c i , c i  fixed s t ruc ture  of excess consumption of commodity 
i = 1 ,2 ,  . . . ,  n 
wj wage coefficient in sector  j = 1 ,2 ,  . . . , n 
- 
vj rate  of n e t  to gross capital in sector j = 1 , 2 , .  . . ,n 
Balancing Equations 
Intermediate Commodities 
Noncompetitive Imports 
Primary Factors 
Trade Balance 
n - W I -  2 P,E, qd - pi:%iid - z pid M~~ = D~ 
Techmlogical  Choice 
ax. 
I 
"j $= ". 
where 
s;' = W j l j  + Q j k j  
(This l a t te r  equation is omit ted from the model, since, by Euler's theorem, it is 
a direct consequence of eqns. 7-9.) 
Import and Jkport f inc t ions  
Noncompetitive Imports 
- 
- Mtr 
mi = min -; 1 
[ M i  : 
Competitive Dollar Imports 
Exports 
Final Demand Equations 
h i c e s  and Costs 
w, = (1 + w)Wj  
Qj = (6, + ", R) P,+, 
n n 
- WI- 
pn+l = x ,n+l + C vd pid mi ,n+l 
i =l t =l  
pF = 
rd , 
I if t.here is no endogenous export pzE price change assumed 
' 1 1  %d i = 1,2, . , . , n  ] otherwise 
Zpd 
, &  
Price Normalization Rule 
4. THE SIMULATION F'RAMEWORK AND DATA 
The data* for the model presented in the previous sections were mostly 
obtained from the 1976 official statistical input-output table of the  Hungarian 
economy (see Csepinszky 1982). Where direct observations were not available 
we had to  rely on expert estimates or various rather  ad hoc methods. Thus, for 
example, there  is no published information available on the area  composition of 
exports and imports. The corresponding data in the  model are therefore only 
rough estimates. Similarly, the initial dollar export prices (expressed in 
domestic currency units) were also estimated using indirect methods. The divi- 
sion of imports into competitive and noncompetitive parts was derived from 
more detailed (product group) investigation based on expert estimates. 
The assignment of values to the parameters occurring in the technological 
and behavioral relationships constitutes a very frequently encountered prob- 
lem. Available econometric estimates are scarce and very unreliable. We have 
followed the  ra ther  comrnon calibration procedure (see, for example, Mansur 
and Whalley 1983) in which most of these parameters a re  "guesstimated" on the  
basis of the available li terature and qualitative judgments, combined with sin- 
gle data point estimates. These latter are derived by assuming the  initial 
(base) s ta te  of the economy to be, a t  least partially, .one of equilibrium. In this 
way, the  model specification is capable of reproducing the initial position of the  
economy and comparative static exercises can be performed. Table 1 contains 
some of the  major indicators of the Hungarian economy in 1976 and also a few 
crucial model parameters. 
The specification of and elasticities in the export relationships deserve spe- 
cial attention here, because the sensitivity of the results with respect t o  these 
factors is  one of the major concerns of this paper. The main role of the export 
function is to  allow some limited shift in the  volume of exports in various sec- 
tors if relative (foreign/domestic) prices change. In linear programming 
models of resource allocation the  same goal (i.e., allowing for some, but  not 
complete specialization) is achieved by the  use of individual bounds on export 
activities. Here, in the case of relative price dependent export functions, the 
larger the elasticities of these functions, the larger the  scope for taking advan- 
tage of international specialization. If, however, they are interpreted as export 
demand functions, which is often the case. then the  foreign price of the  
exported goods is dependent on their volume. The smaller the  elasticities, the  
larger the  size effect of the export volume on prices. The usual size of these 
elasticities is relatively small (-3; -1.5) both in the  available li terature on 
econometric estimates (see, for example, Houthakker and Magee 1969, Sato 
1977, or Browne 1982) and in the  CGE models using such specifications. These 
small elasticities, however, imply that  endogenously-induced terms-OF-trade 
effects will be rather  large, which may be hard to  justify on empirical grounds. 
I t  will, therefore, be interesting to see how the size of the export elasticities 
influence the solution of the model. To this end we have repeated each 
*The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Gy. Boda arid F. Hennelne in furnish- 
ing appropriate data for the model. 
TABLE 1 Sectoral characteristics of production. export and import (percentage shares), and trade elasticity param- 
eters. 
$ Competi- 
tive import/ 
domestic Import 
source * elasticity* 
Import/ 
Share in Export/ $ Export/ Export domestic 
production production production* elasticity* source 
2.27 3.63 0.84 -2.00 74.63 
1.76 1.63 1.01 -3.00 10.34 
4.9 1 33.01 23.00 -2.50 47.91 
13.44 43.55 13.24 -2.50 80.14 
1.63 12.29 7.91 -2.50 25.02 
Net 
income 
shares 
0.250 
0.068 
0.141 
0.282 
0.203 
Sector 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light industries 
8. Other manu- 
facturing 
9. Food processing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal and 
economic sen ices  
18. Health and 
cultural sen ices  
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 100.00 16.90 8.60 20.70 3.45 
*Hypothetical data. 
simulation after doubling the  size of the initial export elasticities. 
Also, besides the pure export demand specification, we have run the model 
with two alternative variants. The first of these can be tentatively interpreted 
as an export supply specification. In this run  we assume that the volume of 
export has no effect on the export price, i.e., that the price is dictated by the  
world market; other than this, we use the same export functions. In the second 
case, we have tried to calculate a solution corresponding to the logic of a pro- 
gramming model or, using a t e rm familiar in international trade theory, to an 
optimal tariff situation. In this run  we assume that the  terms-of-trade effects 
are real, but that they are  not perceived by the atomistic exporters. We wanted 
to  see how the planners optimum (in which the country takes advantage of this 
market "power" in international trade) would differ from the laissez-faire 
equilibrium (the first case). To obtain the exact results would in general 
require the solution of a relatively large nonlinear programming problem. 
Since, however, our model is rather  close to a neoclassical formulation, we can 
approximate this solution by introducing appropriate optimum tariffs into the  
determination of export revenues (for the analytical and theoretical underpin- 
nings of this approach, see Zalai 1982). 
Thus, in effect, we will present in total six runs, which differ partly in 
terms of export specification (pure demand, supply, and optimum tariff) and 
partly in terms of the size of the export elasticities. 
As indicated earlier, the major thrust  of our simulation effort is t o  esti- 
mate the  impact of a price reform on the economy, if the relative price changes 
were followed by appropriate reallocation of resour-ces, including dollar foreign 
trade. In order to do this we assume that the initial state of the economy is 
"almost" a general equilibrium one, in which the only major distortion mani- 
fests itself in the  price system. That is, individual decisions are  viewed as 
roughly economically rational, except that they are based on incorrect price 
information. (As can be seen in Table 1, sectoral prices include ra ther  different 
net  incomes (profits) in different sectors.) The above assumption is admittedly 
very bold, though not inconsistent with some (especially earlier) Hungarian 
reform ideas. More realistic assumptions would require qualitatively different 
model specifications, for which, for the time being, both theoretical and empiri- 
cal bases are  lacking. 
Thus our model, with a slight change in its specification, reproduces the  
1976 situation of the  Hungarian economy. The change is in the  price formation 
rule (see eqn. 21). Prices in the base case equal costs, which also include nor- 
mative net incomes (close to 30 percent on wages and 5 percent on net capital 
value in 1976). "marked-up" by fixed, but sectorally different profit rates. In the  
vatious runs we calculate the effect of the abolition of these profit mark-ups, 
i.e., the  effect of a price reform, where prices are formed according to the prin- 
ciple of uniform (normative) return requirements. The optimum tariff calcula- 
tion includes, in addition, taxes on exports, which distinguishes it  from the  
other two specifications. 
5. THE SIMULATION RESULIS 
Table 2 contains the  sectoral producers' price indexes calculated in the  
various runs. These may be of special interest because there are a number of 
published studies that  have calculated normative prices on the basis of 
input-output tables both in Hungary and elsewhere (see, for example, Ganczer 
1962, BBrAny and Szakolczai 1975, and Banhidi 1978, for Hungary). These 
studies have used a somewhat different methodology; for example, in most 
cases they rely on exogenously-defined normative r e tu rn  ra tes  on labor and 
capital. Even where they are  endogenous (as in the  case of BBnhidi 1978), t he  
method followed i s  different ( a  closed Leontief model). What makes our model 
clearly distinguishable from the  previous ones is t ha t  some of the input 
coefficients themselves (like those of labor and capital) change in  response to  
price changes and tha t  the  (domestic/import) composition of inputs changes. 
TABLE 2 Producers' price indices in various runs. 
Sector 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Dem SUP 0 pt Dem s u  P Opt 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
hdus t r i e s  
8. Other manu- 
facturing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and  
communication 
14. Domestic t rade 
15. Foreign t rade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
In spite of these  and  other differences in methodology, data, or  t ime period 
studied, our  resul ts  show remarkable similarity with those of previous calcula- 
tions. There a r e  striking similarities, not  only in general  tendencies, such a s  
disproportionality between global industrial, agricultural, and  service price lev- 
els, but also in the  rank order of sectors according t o  their  normative price 
level. Comparing the  different runs  one can see tha.t the  price indices in  four 
runs (demand a n d  supply a t  both sets  of elasticities) a r e  practically the  same; 
only the  optimum tariff solution results in somewhat different prices, especially 
in the case of low elasticities. This difference can be clearly traced back to the  
imported input components and to variations in the  dollar exchange rate. The 
latter decreases from its base level by about 20-25 percent in the four runs 
mentioned above, whereas in the optimum tariff runs i t  stays basically the  
same a t  high elasticities and increases by nearly 35 percent at low elasticities 
(see Table 3). 
TABLE 3 Main indicators (aggregate indices a t  base prices): First model. 
Low elasticities 
Dem SUP Opt 
102.04 101.58 100.58 
102.11 101.77 100.91 
99.91 101.52 102.68 
High elasticities 
Indicator 
GNP 
GDP 
Final 
consumption 
Excess 
consumption 
Dollar terms 
of trade 
Total trade/ 
GDP ratio 
Total export 
Total import 
Total compet- 
itive import 
Total non- 
competitive 
import 
Total dollar 
import 
Total dollar 
export 
Dollar ex- 
change ra te  
Return rate 
on wages 
Return rate 
on capital 
Base Dem SUP Opt 
103.06 102.42 102.37 
103.27 102.75 102.66 
100.37 102.28 101.03 
One may wonder why the model suggests revaluation rather  than devalua- 
tion of the Hungarian currency, a t  least in the  pure equilibrium solutions: this 
seems a t  first sight in marked contrast with what conventional wisdom would 
suggest in the case of Hungary. The explanation is in fact rather  simple: it is 
due to  the decrease of price level in the major exporting sectors. If the  
exchange rate remained unchanged or increased, it would in general result in 
growing exports and decreasing imports, and it  would thus violate the trade bal- 
ance condition. Therefore, the exchange rate has to drop accord.ingly. Even in 
this situation, total trade turnover increases and, as expected, relatively more 
so in the case of higher export elasticities. I t  is also interesting to see tha t  the  
increase of exports is larger in the  demand than in the  supply runs, because in 
the former, increased exports have to make up  for the terms-of-trade 
deterioration (total imports increase a t  more or less the same rate in the  two 
types of run). 
The optimum tariff cases produce results that are qualitatively different 
frorri the  other four variants and also from each other in the cases of higher 
and lower elasticities. Lower elasticities imply stronger international market 
power, the exploitation of which results in reduced trade volume and improved 
terms of trade (see Table 3). Thus, quite apart from the increased allocative 
efficiency, additional welfare gains result from the improving terms of trade. 
The increased dollar exchange rate (close to a 35 percent devaluation) makes 
imports decrease. If there were no tariffs on exports, they would increase 
significantly because of the high exchange rate. The tariffs offset this impetus. 
The large difference between the exchange rates in the case of pure demand 
and the  optimum tariff run clearly indicates that the tariffs are quite large. 
Indeed, their size varies between 60 and 100 percent, depending on the size of 
the export demand elasticity. 
When the elasticities are higher, the scope for increasing allocative 
efficiency becomes larger, whereas the terms-of-trade effects become 
significantly smaller. In fact, it proves to be advantageous to utilize the reallo- 
cation possibilities even to the extent where the general level of the terms of 
trade actually deteriorates. The size of the tariffs becomes, of course, much 
smaller in this case (20-35 percent) and as a result of these interacting forces, 
the exchange rate remains practically unchanged. 
Readers interested in more detailed results of t.he simulation runs can find 
additional tables in the Appendix. These include percentage changes in dollar 
exports and competitive imports in different sectors, and the price terms that  
explain the  direction of change in dollar exports and competitive import 
shares, as well as detailed statistics on changes in production and employment 
of the two primary resources, labor and capital. The analysis of these data is 
left to the reader. In the remaining part of the paper we will restrict ourselves 
to an analysis of various general features of our results and draw some broad 
conclusions on the basis of the summary Table 3. 
The main aggregates measuring the output level of the national economy, 
gross (total) national production as well as GDP, show only a modest increase 
resulting from the reallocation of resources. This is a common phenomenon 
frequently- encountered in similar resource allocation exercises. More 
significant changes can naturally be seen in the export and import activities. 
Except for one case, our calculations interestingly reproduce the historical 
observation that imports grow faster than output. This is a direct consequence 
of increased international specialization. As one can see, the measure of the 
openness of the economy, total trade/GDP, increases in all cases but one. The 
exception is the optimum tariff solution a t  low elasticities, which suggests that  
more specialization and increased foreign trade need not necessarily be 
beneflcial for an economy. As we know, this is the case where export prices 
react ra ther  sensitively to changes in export volumes. 
One surprising result of our numerical simulations may be that  in one of 
the runs the move toward a perfect equilibrium situation frorn a distorted one 
results in welfare loss. However, this may only be surprising because we tend 
to associate competitive equilibrium with Pareto optimality. This is, however, 
not the case when the economy is open and faces imperfect.1~ elastic export 
demand. In such a situation the optimal policy is a kind of monopolistic rather 
than pure competitive equilibrium, as is known from the theory of optinium 
tariff. This solution is approximated, as indicated earlier, by the optimum tariff 
run. As we can see, the difference in terms of welfare between the pure 
competitive (laissez-faire) and the optimum tariff (pLa~ne?-s '  optimum) solu- 
tions is close to three percent of total consumption. 
We can further characterize the trade-off possibility between allocative 
efficiency and terms-of-trade efficiency by means of the supply run. This latter 
approximates the potential allocative efficiency gain, i.e., t he  gain that  would 
be achieved in the  absence of terms-of-trade changes. As we can see, this 
potential allocative efficiency gain, a t  low elasticities, is approximately 1.6 per- 
cent of total consumption. This potential efficiency gain is offset by the simul- 
taneous terms-of-trade deterioration in the  demand run. In the optimum tariff 
run it  is not fully utilized, but in that  case the additional gain from the  terms- 
of-trade improvement is significantly larger than the  possible loss from not 
utilizing fully the  allocative efficiency potential. 
Most of our analysis so far has been concerned with the  usual low elasticity 
case. As we have seen, the terms-of-trade effects brought into the numerical 
simulation through the downward-sloping export demand functions are quite 
significant, and seem to be quite unrealistic. The same runs  repeated with the  
sizes of these elasticities doubled clearly exemplify the  dilemma that  the build- 
ers of computable general equilibrium models face. Larger elasticities will 
significantly increase the resource reallocation possibilities and reduce the 
effect of the terms-of-trade changes. Thus, for example, even in the optimum 
tariff run, it  proves to be advantageous to utilize the  resource reallocation 
potential, even to the extent of incurring a deterioration in the terms of trade. 
As can be seen, the laissez-faire and planners'  optimum solutions do not differ 
so much as  in the  previous case. These solutions can, however, be criticized 
because they all.ow for unrealistically large shifts in the  allocation of resources, 
primarily in exports. 
One may believe that  our results, especially the  welfare loss occurring 
after a shift toward equilibrium, have to do with our departure from neoclassi- 
cal assumptions. The consumption structure is fixed, and thus adjustment on 
the consumers' part  is excluded. Also, as mentioned, import share changes are 
treated in a nonneoclassical fashion. It is, therefore, interesting to  check how 
sensitive the simulation results are to  these changes. To this end we repeated 
our exercise with a model strictly in line with neoclassical assumptions. In 
these runs imports were treated as imperfect substitutes and the  usual cost 
minimization assumption was invoked. In the  case of consumption we assumed 
that five percent of total consumption can be readjusted to changing prices in 
accordance with a Cobb-Douglas-type utility function. Thus we employed an 
LEStype demand structure. The main indicators of these runs are summarized 
in Table 4. They clearly indicate that  the  results are qualitatively the  same, 
and even the quantitative differences are negligible. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although there are admittedly rnany speculative elements in our simula- 
tions, we can still draw some conclusions that  may be interesting from the 
economic-policy point of view. First, the phenomenon discussed above seems to 
capture some elements of what actually happened in Hungary in the 1970s. I t  
is very likely that a large part  of the terms-of-trade deterioration tha t  Hungary 
suffered over the past ten years was endogenously induced. To offset the  effects 
of external terms-of-trade changes and to  compensate for increasing imports, 
Hungary had to export more and more. The inability t o  build up new, more 
efficient export capacities added an endogenously-induced terms-of-trade 
TABLE 4 Main indicators (aggregate indices a t  base prices): Second model. 
Indicator 
GNP 
GDP 
Final 
consumption 
Variable 
consumption 
Implicit wel- 
fare function 
Dollar terms 
of trade 
Total trade/ 
GDP ratio 
Total export 
Total import 
Total compet- 
itive import 
Total non- 
competitive 
import 
Total dollar 
import 
Total dollar 
export. 
Dollar ex- 
change rate 
Return rate 
on wages 
Return rate 
on capital 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Base Dem SUP Opt Dem SUP Opt 
100.00 102.35 101.95 100.98 103.41 102.86 102.70 
100.00 102.33 102.05 100.93 103.51 103.09 102.87 
100.00 100.00 101.87 102.56 100.56 102.68 101.23 
deterioration to the  external one. 
Second, a general lesson that can be learned is tha t  economic reforms that  
do not reach and genuinely affect the micro decision level can produce only 
modest, if any improvement in overall economic efficiency. Unless there are 
major changes in the  micro structure of production, leading to more efficient 
use of resources a t  the  enterprise level and more profitable and exportable pro- 
ducts, a price reform followed by a rational reallocation of resources will not 
produce satisfactory results. 
Third, the simulation results also suggest that a complete decentralization 
of foreign trade, especially the export activity, may not be advantageous if 
export demand is  imperfectly elastic. Domestic firms may not  perceive the 
opportunities arising and may therefore behave as atomistic price takers. 
Therefore there is some room for the central planning authorities t o  guide indi- 
vidual decisions in more generally beneficial economic directions. 
Fourth, and partly related to the above issue, i t  is interesting to note that  
general price distortions may result in welfare improvement, similar, but not 
equal to the effect of optimal tariffs. Thus, if some international agreements, 
such as  those of GATT, exclude the possibility of applying tariffs on exports, it 
is, a t  least  in theory, possible to use general taxes on production as  a second- 
bed  solution. 
And finally, as a niethodological observation, we may conclude from our  
analysis t ha t  in computable general equilibrium models it seems crucial to  dis- 
tinguish and separate  the 'envisaged changes in the  export prices ( te rms  of 
trade) from those in the speed of export adjustment.  One crude and  pragmatic 
solution might be t o  use one set  of relatively small elasticities in the  export 
functions, and another  se t  of relatively larger elasticities in the  determination 
of export prices (see Zalai 1982 for details of this solution). Needless to say, t he  
degree of freedom in reallocating resources in a n  open economy depends 
greatly on the  potential for foreign trade. Thus, it is crucial in such exercises 
to  represent  this potential properly. At present it appears t ha t  nei ther  the  
t e h n i q u e s  used in  linear programming nor those in computable general equili- 
brium models a r e  fully adequate for handling this  problem. 
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TABLE A1 Percentage changes in doll~ar exports. 
Low elasticities 
- 
High elasticities 
Dem SUP Opt 
79.99 73.93 71.42 
47.33 42.11 71.37 
125.62 116.59 106.01 
190.64 175.14 187.90 
85.41 77.75 95.04 
Sector Dem 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
facturing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade* 
16. Waterworks* 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 
*Exogenously fixed. 
TABLE A2 Percentage changes in competitive dollar imports. 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Dem Dem SUP Opt 
112.74 112.48 98.10 
Sector 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
fac turing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 
TABLE A3 Relative price terms in the export and import functions. 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Opt* Opt* 
Sector Dem Sup 
100.36 103.50 
107.58 110.87 
91.86 94.00 
84.04 86.30 
98.19 101.11 
Exp Imp 
117.48 58.74 
96.35 64.23 
105.58 63.35 
90.03 54.02 
99.32 59.59 
Dem Sup Exp Imp 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
fac turing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
*The difference between the export and import price terms is due to the  export 
tariffs. 
TABLE A4 Percentage changes in production. 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Dem s u  P 
109.12 107.80 
104.77 104.17 
114.48 110.60 
115.19 112.73 
98.76 98.08 
Dem s u  P 
105.69 104.73 
103.23 102.84 
111.48 108.60 
109.21 107.65 
100.51 99.84 
Sector 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
facturing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 
TABLE A5 Percentage changes in employment. 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Dem SUP Dem SUP Opt 
101.36 100.39 104.29 
100.86 100.57 101.45 
109.41 106.63 99.41 
108.04 106.51 105.14 
99.49 98.90 100.22 
Sector 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
facturing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 
TABLE A6 Percentage changes in capital used. 
Low elasticities High elasticities 
Dern SUP Opt 
118.06 116.64 114.70 
105.54 104.88 104.41 
117.31 113.25 110.93 
119.93 117.25 118.39 
99.91 99.12 100.53 
Sector Dern 
1. Mining 
2. Electricity 
3. Metallurgy 
4. Machinery 
5. Construction 
materials 
6. Chemicals 
7. Light 
industries 
8. Other manu- 
fac turing 
9. Food pro- 
cessing 
10. Construction 
11. Agriculture 
12. Forestry 
and logging 
13. Transport and 
communication 
14. Domestic trade 
15. Foreign trade 
16. Waterworks 
17. Personal 
and economic 
services 
18. Health and 
cultural 
services 
19. Public ad- 
ministration 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
